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"From the Pyrcnees o11 dowii, 1 am not interested in, 
nor do 1 know anything abolir, the southcrri portioii of tlie world." 
Henry Kiiiinget ci~ca 1974' 
uch of what historians takc as an analytic framework for thc interpretation of any given 
polttlcal context depcnds ncarly a lw~ys  on an inherited perspcctive dcrived from the ide- M . .  
ological crossfirc of tlie time: in othrr words, propaganda becomes dignified with thc passagc 
of rime and apostheosized inro analysis and elucidatiuri, to a large extent, hy dint of mcrc repe- 
tition and scant exploration of more than a fcw standard sourccs. Thus, no marter how Iirniteil 
in focus, mariy idcal liccorrie codified as "fIistory", in an especially perverse expression of thc 
rclf-fulfilling prophrry: iinahlc to withstand thc prcsaurc of cvents, such ideological concepts 
are nonetheless rcalized after dcarh, as i r  wcrc, whereupon ensconsced, they define such an 
imaginary pastas thcy wcre iiicapalile of deteriniriing whcn ir was still the present. Despite al1 
the attention giveii in recenr years to thr avoidsnce of rrificatiuii. little self-criticism has bccn 
applied by historians to thr nnrrriurness iif ~ l i c  iio~ioiial strucrures they transmit to utticr social 
disciplincs, where they are raken up, in turn uncr~tically, :inti iisetl tri cuiistruct 111 sorrs of 
ideational edifices. This is cspccially true of political areas rhat are peripheral to central con- 
cerns and which are thercfori intriistcd to local historiographies. Thcse are almosr universally 
mere sounding hijards h r  rhose ideological prcoccupations at rhr heart of local conflict. Their 
intcrcsts, bound up in al1 manner of mtirol iii*iificati<in, are parred up the scientific frcding- 
chain, where thsy work their way into such ideological reformulation as ttir I s>t r~i  oradeniic 
convention or craze interacts with the evolution r>f political pairerns. To be most concrete, we 
are suggesting that the Cuhan-Spanish-U.S. triangle is a perfect enarnple of such an evolution. 
The rerms in which propaganda hetween factions surrounding the independence of the 
Caribbcan island was formulatcd litcrally brramr srlf-fiilfilling prophccy, that is, the way bc- 
Iiivior would eventually politically judged over tiiiie, perccivcd in quitc rigid ways. 
THE CONTINUITY OF CUBAN NATIONALIST HISTORIOGRAPHY 
nme of these background conflicrs in nationalist discourse can be seen in a recent work, 
which promises to bc influentiñl in the somewhat narrow field of English-language Cuhan S 
\tudies. JLoiiis A. Percl. Jr. ir prnhably rhe most outstanding historian o f  Cuban history, with a 
considerable Corpus of work at his hatk arid ; ir )  rxlioii*tive knriwlcdge of Cuban and Unitid 
States' sources on the last hundred years of the greatest of rhe Antilles. IJtrez'r laics~ buok is a11 
l ' Cired in N.W.A. (19741, p. 45. 
iinpassioned denunciarion of'rhr wickrd and rnanipulativc interplay between U.S. perceptionr, 
U.S. inipcrial iieetls, and subsequent Amcricanist historiography, tradirionally notorinus Sor its 
scant interest in other social rcalities beyond its b o r d e r ~ . ~  The tict suni, in Pércz's vision, is most 
painful to Cuban sensibility. PC~CZI book has heen greeted with the clairn that it repreients a 
bold "deconstruction" of both sliort arid Iongterm V.S. perceptions about the Cuban War OS 
1895-1898 and i t s  outctime. Nrvertheless, Pirez's argument ir sulistati~iall~ iliat ul' Ciiban na- 
tionalist historiography that bloomed after thc 1933 rcvolurion, as cxcinplified by Emilio Roig 
de Leuchsenring. 
Let us examinc with morc attcntion the Ciiban nationalist thesis, as it developed ftotii Roig 
to PL-rc&. Iii 1945, Rrig cnurncratcd thirtecn "conclusions" referring to tlir revolutionary 
proccss in Cuba throughout the Nincteenth Century.3 Witlioiii rt,llr,wirig tlirrn in drtail, for 
lack of space, thesc can be fiirly surnrnarized as iollows. T h r  Cuban indcpcndence movement 
was a continuuni frotn its incepiinii i r >  i I i +  drfrat of Spain, marked by a prolonged thirty-ycar- 
long conflict iip to 1898. If the 1868 War war led fronl above, by the bourgeosic, thr 1895 con- 
flici, wliir:ti r:l«xd thr struggle, was inipellcd from below, and dctermiiird by Marti's farsighted 
ideological pcrceptions. which called (aniotig niany oilicr things) for a fight without hatred for 
Spaniards in Cuba, bur with implacable hostility towards those rcsponsible for oppression, in 
faraway Spaiti. Autniiornists werc spokrsrnen for a small minority and a lort causc, if nnt worsr. 
Tlie Ciiban nationalist movement, therefore, literally was Cuba, atid rcpre~eiitcd her fully, with 
articulated underground institutions and cffccrivcly waged guerrilla warfare.' Thc  Spanish 
forccr. with no recourse but terrorism (Weylrr's "reconcentration" policy), wcre already basi- 
cally dcfcatcd whcn rhc Unitcd States -which had long conteniplated tlie islaii<l witti i I i+  i r i t r r i t  
of esrahlishing its control, and which by the end of thc cciitury had rctliired it to a virtual eco- 
nomic colony- stepped into the conflici.s As is t i i  !ir rxlirrtrd, thr rovetous attcntion of a long 
list of presidents and othcr Anicrican ~iublic officials in acquiring the prize of tlie <:arililieaii 
froni Spaiii wa* a i:rritral thrmr of Cuban h is t~r iograph~,  aas nationalism surged with ever 
grcetcr intcnsity after the frustrations of the 193.3 revtiliiiiiiii ;irid ttir rnaintrnanre of U.S. in- 
valvrment in Cuban affair~ conrinuetl dripitr the formal abrogarion of the protectorate.6 
In 1950, Roig de Lriii.lirrriririg alsu rnadc his thcsis morc explicii in book forni.' H r  stressid 
the working nature of rhr infrastructure of revolt, both rnilitary antl political, drspitr its somc- 
what tatty appearance. At the same time, this signified the effective defcat of opporing Spanish 
forces, which he documents tiiosily wirh Spni rh  sources, from contemporary essays and jour- 
nalism (likc Morote), to more reflenivc, early historiographic materials from tlie pre 1936 years 
(frorn (lrrcgn Rubio to Romanones or üabriel Maura). Thc overbearing U.S. prescnce, fol- 
lowed in narrative detail frotn Jefferson oiiwards, mcrcly certified the degree to which rhc 
nothcrn neighbor had become the true eiiemy of Cuban self-deterinination. Logically, thc l i t ~  
erature ol  thr Castro rrvolution took over such argumcntation wholsesale, but tliat has not 
meant that exilc commentary has in any way ahandniicd a similar vicwpoint, whicb remains 
firmly anchored in thc vcritics of the Nineteenth-Cenrory liberation struggle, with Martí ;is 
everyone's saintly aposrle. In  fart, the 9th National Congrcss of History in Cuba (cited at theend 
l..A. Pércz Jr. (1998). 
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of the 1960 third edition of Roig's essay) formally decided to recommend to the Minister of Ed-
ucation "that the programs and texts of our Patriotic History [Historia Patrial be accordingly re-
vised so that they might show clearly the fact demostrated by. Doctor Roig de Leuchsenring that
Cuba does not owe her independence to the United States [italics in the original]."8
Perez has picked up where Roig left off, with the advantage of a much greater spread of
sources, especially of U.S. historiography, which becomes the central thrust of his study. In
short, Perez presents the all but triumph of the Cuban independentist cause and the withering
away of Spanish offensive capacity. Accordingly, U.S. intervention was an external "coup de
grace", basically unnecessary at best and most ungenerous at worst. Basically, Perez argues, the
Americans deceived themselves to their own advantage. The evolution of their sentiments
quickly congealed into a hard, historiographic verity, which has been endlessly reiterated by
U.S. history texts thereafter. This is, no doubt, quite true.
More specifically, Perez shows how the initial enthusiasm for the "poor Cuban Patriots",
which called forth many American volunteers and helped spread idealistic war fever, was a
sympathetic call for justice, combining Cuban appeals for self-determination with the will to
avenge U.S. victims ("Remember the Maine!"). As soon as American troops landed in Cuba,
however, their ingenuous affection in the abstract for the Patriot cause began to wither: they
found the ragtag Cubans unattractive, with an attitude problem, insofar as they were not will-
ing to assume the role of faithful helpers that the Americans had allotted to them. Obviously,
although Perez does not underline the point, the racial divide was cutting on both sides of the
cross-cultural meeting. Furthermore, and quite unsurprisingly, Cuban guerrilla forces, howev-
er much they might claim to be the regular army of a formal, if insurgent, government, had lit-
tle punctuality and scant coordination, except on their own terms. 9 At the same time, their
armed pressure on Spanish columns, of major indirect effectiveness to the U.S. campaign on the
island, was not very visible to American forces. So American irritation quickly turned to dis-
dain: U.S. troopers allegedly were doing all the work and all the fighting for slovenly, shifty in-
grates who "turned tail" at their convenience. As Perez indicates, such sentiments rapidly
turned even more sour, eventually becoming the claim to an exclusive American victory, and,
therefore, the justification for U.S. military occupation, non-recognition of Patriot revolution-
ary political institutions and political claims, and, in the last instance, for the imposition of a dis-
guised protectorate together with a granted independence. Finally, as Perez demostrates with
abundant quotes, U.S. national historiography has since endlessly repeated the same final
judgements, which have become conventional wisdom.
Perez is right to stress the degree to which Spanish war effort was worn out by the combi-
nation of disease and guerrillas (a point stressed by Roig), but, despite some interesting con-
temporary sources, he does not some much demostrate, as baldly state the old nationalist thesis
that Cuban nationalists had won the war. There is a difference between one side losing a war
and the other winning it, and nothing is presented to show that Spanish forces would not have
been able to hold a stalemate in both conflicts -Cuba and the Philippines- for a considerablely
longer period of time without the cut-off of an American intervention, in fact, as long as Spain
could hold the ports and control maritime access to the island, without having insular civil war
spread to peninsular politics. But naval defeat meant the automatic collapse of any war effort.
As numerous well-known examples in a colonial or neo-colonial context have shown
throughout the Twentieth Century, guerrilla wars tend to be won politically rather than mili-
8 E. Roig de Leuchsenring (1960), p. 155.
9 Col. E. Bujac (n. d.).
rarily. In Algcria, for exarnple, French forces imposed tlicrrisrlves in rhc physical battle against 
rlie nationalisr coinhat uriits and ciiiild cven face a campaign of wirliering terrorism, but the rc- 
tentionist caiirii rould nor politically sustaiii rlie strain that chis effort deinaiiilerl of metropoli- 
tan socicry, and, after sucics3ive jolts ro miinland insrituriiiiis, De Gaullc cvciitually opted Fiir 
peacc, a t  the expense of Pro-French opinion in the tcrritory.J0Seen ¡ti ibis light, rhe determin- 
ing point of Cuhan victory (and Filipino triuinpli) was not to be found in the islands thcrnselves, 
but in peninsular Spanisli riicirty. Neverrhcless, in 1898, there was still no massive opposirion t i )  
a war 1mlicy overseas, a fact which meaiit thar rhe socicry as a whole coul<l still withstand the 
cost. On thc contrary, generalized discontent over "n;itional goals" unachieved and systematic 
protest camc afterwards, as thr rrsult of a humiliating "disaster" a r  U.S., nor Cuban, hands. 
Pérez exhibirs a cerrain nationalist hitirrriess for the lack of recognition of helligerent rights 
to the Cuban Junta, I i i i t  the fact was that the Cuban rrbels did not control any cities, a ~iaridard 
cnpression of indisputable control iif territory, and such a legal rrliiiff has been onc of the re- 
peatcd side-cffrrts of succcssful guerrilla carnpaigns throughout the Twentieili C~ntury .  The 
probable fact that the Spanish authoritics ceased to control rriuch of the interior for longdecatlcs 
after 1868, snmcwhat unfairly perlia~is, was not a comparable criterion: no colonial empire at 
that time had rffrctive sway in al1 of its "busli" anrl, in conscquence, interrtatr rrliitions diplo- 
matically avoided such a Iiricl<ly quesrion (a situation tliat would latcr bcnefit independerii 
Cubnri giivernmenrs).l' Pérez does, howrver, makc a good point -not irriincl in Roig- to the ef- 
fect that the establishment of autonomy cut tlir lirart out of thc españolistas ancl weakened 
Spanish comhat morale in grri~ral, but his cvident nationalist distaste for thc loyalist side kerps 
hini fri>in exploring rhis further (quite ilir npposite, as would be expected, of Spanish histori- 
ans, who, given tlir present reorganization of Spain in regional autonomies, Iiavr suddenly 
Coiirid al1 rnanncr o t  approaches ti> the Cuban and Puerto Riraii "aiitvnomtsras").J2 In fact, to 
measure tlir degree of k'ércz's nationalisiii, orir should remark on his com~ilrte indifferencc to 
Spain (not even incluclc<l as an enrry in the indcx or g i v ~ n  arrrntion in the bibliograpliical es- 
say), whirh remains, in his argunieiii, a mere prcscnce, trotted-out qiiitr hriefly to bc dismisscd, 
a hackdrop tri iIir major subject, which is the U.S. herrayal of Cuban hopes alid rvrn of its own 
momentary idealism." Tliis viewpoint has other costs. Hih grneral lack of interest in thr Philip- 
piiies mrans rhar rhe tar greater Iiiiiriiliations suffered by Filipino nationalirm in al1 respects are 
nevcr used as an rlement of comparison whii.li rriight counrcrbalance iiiore cornparatively his 
Irmenration of American moral misrreatmcnt of the Cuban raiisr.14 
All in all, mosr of rhis boils down to tlir sum of abuses that a great Pnwrr can imposc upon 
a minor neighbor, srrri through thc eyes ofrhe latter. PCrez even cnds his arguineni with a pure- 
ly nominalist dcmand, oncc agziin inheritcd from Roig de Lriichsenring: [he conflict of 1898 
should be I,roperly called the "Spanish-Ciihan-America" War" (or eveii "S~anish-Cuban-Fil- 
ipino-American"), rather than thc plain, old and excliisive "Spanish-American" labrl. Rur, once 
in a nominalisr terrain, he has iio problem with the notion of "America" as synonymous wiili 
the United States, rather than as a g~ogra~ihical  conccpt by which al1 Nrrtli and Sourh Ameri- 
'O J. 'I'alborr (1980); R [>ror 61 E. Lcver (1982) 
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caris woiild he covered. This is a traditional Larin Americaii point of protert as r~gards  U.S. 
hegcmony arid its riilriiral carelessncss, and serves to indicar? rhe narrowiiess of Pérez's natlon- 
alisr critique.fi 
Clearly, Pércz is wriring to confronr what he feels should be a guilty L1.S. coriscieiice. 
Specifically, he cliides Ainericanisu f'or haviiig sy~rrrnaticall~ ignored Cuhan historiography.'6 
(J.S. historians, whrn preseiiting rhe evolution oliriternal American politics for an American 
audience, arr accustomed to a coiiventional tone of natiorialisrri (or "patriotisin", nationalism 
beiiig a non-word in (J.S. politics); this ir so Iiabitual as ro be taken fur granted, needless to say, 
especially wlien writing rchoolhookr rhat make a profit wlien approved by usually consrrvative 
local edurnrional cornmittees for large-scalc use. Admittedly, this may be changing in a rririlti- 
culturalist line, however rriurli debated." N~verthclcss, [he sacraliza~ioii of a peculiar scnsc of 
nacional mission remainr an ahiding trcild in U.S. hir t~r io~raphy,  longcriticizcd, at least in pri- 
vare, by non-Americanist professionals, siich as Europeanists. Accordingly, U.S. historiaris writ- 
irig texthooks should bc compared to Cuban hirroriaris writing the sarnr, and we could 
accordirigly flnd qiinilar laudatory and self-justificarory dicourrea. Iiisofar as Pérer rcprcsents 
the continuity of Cuban iiarionalist historiography, he, as a dirccr cnnsequeiice, objectr to t h ~  
cotitiiiuity of Amercanirt (or U.S. natir>nalist) historiography. 
Gciing further, howcver, if wc look Liackward at the prcsi~ppositions of the lasr hiindred 
ycars of "yanqui bullying" in the Caribbean Basiri, we can sce how thc confidence born of the 
cornbination of eronornic arid cultural power, hascd ori tlie por<ession of a political system 
which, for rcarons both mrssianicand rorivenient, has becornc the primr glrilial model, can pro- 
diice thr worst sort of presumptuous srnsc of supcriority. In other words, sad to say, <:ivic rul- 
ture plus geopolitics equals racisiri, with a push and a justiricalion. Thus, if the arrogance of a 
major power is a blatantly riarioiialist discourse, thcn rhe hyper-defcr~aiveiiess of a rninority na- 
tionalism made good, achieving intlepeiidence only to diicovcr rhar such is nut nearly enough, 
will lead down an even more exalted path. If wc push such "dcconrtruction" further, huwever, 
we shall soori rcach a hall of mirrors in which rhe c.iiltiirally-susrained insecurities of cach soci- 
ety -in addirion interactiue, iii this case- can he broken down and analyzed indefinitcly. 
Beyond this point, howevrr, al1 iliings are rior cqiiñl. Put in terms of rhr so-cillcd "realist Ira- 
dition" in i,,terprerating pourcr politirs, Yirez's view siiffrrs from the presumprion ttiat al1 
Srarrr carry thc aariie weight, or, at least, should tir rriadc to act as if siich cquality were in fact 
trur. But the nrrds of a majvr power are ntit the samc as rhosc ulo  iriinor statr, nor should they 
be. As Ptr r z  himiclf ~inwitr~ngly shows, there are important differenres i r i  liaiiics of referencc 
(such as geographical rracli) and, thereforc, in levels of discourse. Wirh 1898 as 2 jump-off 
point, U. S. historians ofren reflcct a inacropolitical strategic vision of a world-scale player, how- 
ever clumsy, bur certainly drrisive of more "parochial" nceds. In marked opposition, those who 
assurnr the perspective of Cuban natiorialisin equally rnust carry thc burden of a clearly mega- 
Iiiirianiar self-importancc (Castro's Cuba has stiowti rhe wcight o l~ l i i s  clf-important national- 
ist traditio,, by criiharking on impcrial revolutionary ad\,critures iii Africa aiirl throughniir thc 
" Adrnittcdly, thrrc ir a deunhofrynonyrns, rnadc warre by rh? fric !tia< tcansculrural usagc can &en be offcnrive!ray 
thc tcrrri "yaiiqui'', or "Nurili Aiiiciican" ro Canadionr) or untranrlnrable (like 'csrii(oiindienx"), whiili 1 would pre- 
fcr to dcal with hy accepring rrandzrd, pnlire urage, wirh al1 i i>  ri>iirradictionr. as docs Péree quite rensibly The sensc 
of rhe obiervarion, hnwcvci, ir rhat norninaliam IS usually a onc-way rrreer,deriving riicaiiing from a pivcii rulrural con- 
tcxt. To become erercired "ver 3 nominal qu~rrion, finding in it a dur. or prerending ro correct. on a rnotter of dispiir~, 
ilic l>irroriral fanrasy rif i i i ic  roricry wirh the values of anorher, ir, rimply plir, [he pureir exprcsririii iif national>rrn. 
'"cspitc rhc efiorrr of, for enamplc, D.C. Corbirr (1963). 
" See A .  Sdlle (1998) (witli a I Iispanic howlci I..Bartolomeo Gornez" foi Ehleban Góiiicrl on ~i 11). 
Ameriras for as long as thc international balance of power permittcrl such exercises).'8 Finally, 
in a similar ifeven less relevanr franieof niiiid, Slianish historians are situated by thc same evcnr 
of 1898 in a paranoid pers~icctive: thar of an ex-super power, long ago burnt out and hecrirnc 
nienrally almosr a minoriry iiationalisrri in itself, buried by the bias of history and unable to 
come to grips wiili ihc  fact and the conscquent prejudice. 
Pérez prcsents his case in rcrms of "discourse": whar U.S. suurces said as evcnts unfolded 
during 1898, and whar they have repeaic:d since rbcn. But there are serious historiographic 
problems with tliis sort o i  revisionism as a workiiig hypothesis, dcspite thc clainis of contem- 
porary literary theory. By placing rhr onus of interpretation on tlie notion of "discourse", cvery- 
thing is su<lrlrnly up in thc air, as light as rrlativity can make it. Undoubtrilly out heads work 
this way, but we do also homp our noses on hard thing.r if we let relativity become r>ur only 
gui~lr ;  as ir morc than well kiiowii, ~ihilosophers have been struggling with chis conundruiii in 
one way oi aiiuther since rhc carly Eighteeiiili Crntury, although historians especially on rhc 
Frcnch-American axis- serrri to have discovered the potenti;il of such rctlcxion only in tlir last 
twenty-tive years. Undoubtedly, al1 "<liscoiirses" in some sense do surt uf float io the Zeitgeist 
and freely interacr, forming patrerns whicli hisliirians can interpret, but the jurnp from onc 
sphere of writing to anotlier is not necessarily autoinatic. Thi~s, to cite historians as a juniblr, 
however irnpressive rhc sourcing, with litilr or no contcxtualization, provrs scarcely more than 
thc fact of reiteratigBri. Americanists have had major historiographic debates in tlir Twenrieth 
Crntury, roa  large dcgree arouiid the significance of the U.S. as a world power. Was the surge 
of 1898 the result of capitalist pressuies, as  H.U. Faulkner, Charlcs A. Benrd and thc progres- 
sivcs asserted in tlic 1910s and 192Os?'Y Or, ratlier, was it a cultural phenomenon, as Pratt 
replied in the 1930s?" Was it a "I~rrss war", ser offby the rise of rhr sensationalist "yellow jour- 
nalism" on the w;iy coa mass media socictyi2' Prrhaps such discussion was "iiitrrnal", orient- 
rd  rowards the inner pararnrtrrs of U.S. politics, but latcr hisroriographic tumbles have bren 
aimed at doubting the verities of foreign wars: this reticente on tlie iailat~onisdinrcrnationalist 
front affects even Mi115 in [he intcrwar ycars, aiicl from him to William Applerrian Williams, 
Ernest May or even I<olko LL[I tu flnd during the Vietnani iiitrrvencion, as well as the atteiiti<iri 
periodir:olly given to dissent f ron~  expansionist unanimity." The  c o ~ i r r ~ t u a l  cenrer of the on- 
going, century-loiig discussion, sometimcs quite Iiittrr. betwcen Americanist Iiistorians revero 
direitly ro Pérez's thcsis. The  puinr may bc summarized as a qurstion: was (or is) the United 
States brutally irriperialisric, indistinguishable in fact from Gcrmany, or is decolonization the 
"American way" in intcrn;itional affairs?'? 
Surrly, U.S. Amcricanist historiography has becn markedly iiatiorialist, in a tradition strong- 
ly built and siisrained by civic religion.-" Even more, it has been argued tliar the end of the 
Nineteenth Century was i-liaracterized by a broad-scale "discovery of History" in thr IJriited 
States, rvcn if not especially due to rhr War in Cuba." In thc Old Soi~th, however, there was no 
doubt that the rrrurn to the nacional rnainstrrarri war due directly toa short and s~iccessful for- 
eign war, waged for a tra<liiii>nal Sourhcrn geopolitical olijecrive, which pcrinittcd forrrirr Con- 
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federates literally to "rally 'round the flag". 26 Such ideological reaffirmations -and specifically
the sequence established by Perez- may serve to point up lines of U.S. diplomatic interest, but,
in and of itself, they are not a "plot". To trace the interaction of contemporary opinion, politi-
cal legitimation, historical reelaboration, and, finally, repetition in textbooks as having more in-
tent than happenstance, until it seems virtually malign, implies this. And, if the bias is
accidental, then it must be structural, forming a broader part of the culture as a whole, beyond
the circumscribed territory of U.S.-Cuban nationalist confrontation, into more important is-
sues: anti-Catholicism, anti-Hispanism, anti-Afro-American racism, which overwhelm and in-
corporate the lesser, more specific Cuban-U.S. dispute.
Without question the great central debate in Americanist historiography has been about the
Turner "Frontier thesis", posed for the first time in 1893. 27 After much discussion, the long-dis-
credited proposition has come back into consideration, in large measure though "Culture Stud-
ies" and the overwhelming interest in understanding American racism and violence that has
dominated the last decades in the United States Z 8 While the Turner thesis was being down-
played among U.S. historians, between the 1940s and 1960s, the idea of a the frontier as a bor-
der, separating the almost missionary expansion of "White Anglo-Saxon Protestant" (or
so-called WASP) attitudes from the Hispanic world caught the attention of many Spanish-lan-
guage academic essayists, from, for example, the Spanish literary critic (resident in New York)
Angel del Rio to the Venezuelan Mariano PicOn-Salas to the Cuban Jorge Manach, often using
more systematic studies of North-South interaction by U.S. researchers, such as Harry Bern-
stein or S.T. Williams.29 Clearly, the awakening discussion of Afro-American racial oppression
in the United States seemed relevant to Mexican-American or even simply Mexican realities, as
well as, notoriously, the treatment meted out to Native Americans 30 Furthermore, from a
broad Hispanic perspective, it was easy to place such renewed perception in a "longue duree"
mode, rather than in an immediatist or short-term viewpoint.37 And, finally, until the triumph
of "ethnic politics" and the alleged end of the WASP ascendancy (usually identified with the
Kennedy election in 1960), White Protestants were not thought of (and certainly did not tend
of think of themselves) as anything other than the defining group of American citizens. 32 The
resulting trend in Amercanist historiography still may be relegated to the Colonial past or the
period of the early Republic and may be too narrowly defined as "Spanish" (or "Mexican"), but
it nevertheless is present. 33 The rest of this essay will attempt to situate the themes underlined
by Perez, and which have made up the tradition of Cuban nationalist historiography, in this
broader context.
NATIONALISMS AND PARADIGMS
About forty years ago, in a quickly reknowned article, the U.S. sociologist Robert K. Mer-ton codified the concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy. 34 Combining psychoanalytic in-
26 G.M. Foster (1987).
27 F.J. Turner (1994); F.J. Turner (1960).
28 R. Drinnon (1990); R. Slotkin (1993); R. Slotkin (1996).
29 A. del Rio (1965); M. Picon-Salas (1952); J. Manach (1970); H. Bernstein (1965); S.T. Williams (1955). An implicit
warning by an Americanist historian to what he obviously considered misinterpretation, even abuse, of the "Turner
thesis" by Hispanic authors: R.E. Reigel (1952).
30 R.W. Johannsen (1985); A.G. Pettit (1980).
31 J.A. Ortega y Medina (1989).
32 C.H. Anderson (1970).
33 D.J. Weber (1992).
34 R.K. Merton (1968), ps. 475-490.
sight (as was fashionahlc in the 1950s) with the sclicmatic patrerning of social hehavior cstab- 
Iished I>y Talcott Parsons, Mertori defined such patteriis or  behavior: "The self-fulfilling 
lirophecy ir, in rlic beginning, afnlse defiiiiirin of the situation evokiiig a new hehavior which 
rriakes the originally false ainception bccomr true." He  r:ontinucd: "The specious validity of thc 
self-fulfilling prophccy prrpetuates ;i reign of error. For the prophct will ritc rhc actual courre 
of everits as proof tliat h r  was right from rhe liegirining." H e  then went oti to add that a mis- 
Icading starting point could ar:tiially creatc "the very coiiditions of its fulfillmcnt".35 Given the 
clarity of tlie ohservation, thc terin becarnr almost immediately a common rerm in populat 
English-language usagr, but, surprisingly, there war considerable rericcnce ir ,  rnore scientitic 
circles. N»t that anyonr pardcularly drnied the viilue of such a rrotion. Simply, rhat political on- 
alysts -especially tiistorians, always alniost glcchilly disdainfiil of sociological formulation- did 
iiut find any usetul applic;iiiun and consequently did not use thc idca. Quite oii rIir rontrary, 
this papcr will attempt to show that siich abstinclicc has a higli aiialytic cost. 
'Thc slirewd readr.7 will have noriced the effort su far niadc by the authoi lo rlude any Kuhn- 
iaii hrmulation, given rhe rclativr discredit that pateiit abuse has madc of his model oriritcl- 
lcctual behavior, in particular the concept of "paradigm" hring scandal<iiisly rcified as a gcneric 
fact when i t  is only a dehatahle hyputhesis about ~1ic suciology of scienrific coirirriiinitics~6 Iii  
fact, as 1 write, 1 can contemplare an advertiscnicnt in a slick iiitrrnational magazine iii whirh 
a parrnt prattles ori ahaut "puradign~atic cIiarigcV; it would be difficult t<i imagine a still at- 
ccl~table sociological teriii in poorer reputc. Neverthelesr, it is worth rernernberiiig what is thc 
iiltim.zte nicasure of succcss with idcds: thc ongoiiig cvolution of scr:ial life tends to devour so 
ciological concepts by moving thcni out of tlic Iiiirer realms of acadeinic dcbate and incorpo- 
ratiiig rhcm by way of jouriiali,rii into [he daily rough-aiid-tiirnble, ti11 rheir value is so debascd 
liy cominon appropriition as to reiider ttirm unattractive to the ~o~hist icated.  Uiiattractivc, 
howevcr. dors not meari iinusuable, and the point 1 ;ir" trying to make with Merton could jusi 
as eisily -and perhalis more clearly- be made with Kuhn. 
Iri sum, i i i y  argiirnent, in four steps: firci, longstanding conflict, esperially civil war, gener- 
atrs rciterative propagand;~ within a determined poliiically-defincd rommunity (ur rammuni- 
ties), wliicli cmbodies horh the idcalr of a cause antl its concrete war objectivcs, which niay ur 
may not be the sairir. Second, siich partisan ~iositions arc worked out, by thrir very repetition, 
to ;ippral siniulrarirously to ilir rmotions and to ratiotialization, to home clientelt: that must 
wiihstaiid i l i r  rtruggle and to foreign audiences whosr opinioii iriay prove dccisive to the oiit~ 
come. Third, the resiiliition of armed conflict usually means that whatever final result is nor- 
iiially perceived in terms of the polarized propaganda dirirird over and over duriiig rlir years of 
battle; if therr i5 iignificant disilluaion in any o€ thc niajor audieticer <if one of the principal war 
messagcs, this opinioii will swing over to the orlicr, opposing themc of propaganda, now seeii 
as a corrt:rtive, when before ir was perceivcd as filthy lies, Iirrrft of al1 credibility. Iii tliis sense, 
1 am speaking of propaganda discourse a s  bring a self-fulfilling prophecy, as dcfined by Mer- 
ton. Finally, four, when historians -usually at soiiie ilistance, and thus with tlie liberating igno- 
rance that time brings- stuinble iiucr the political literaturr of such a conflict, they iend to 
gravitate t o a  particular propaganda polarity Icd by thcir own ideologiral prejudiccs. Sirice tlie 
rcpetition of argurnent is oiitstanding, the diligent resrarcher can tind rnuch pr<vrf to burrcos his 
position. Arrordingly, he or she is ar:ting wirhin a paradigtri, happily rncasuririg detail iinder 
thc warni glow o í a  oceived idea, which ir, nftrr all, what Kiihn was lalking about. 
'' K.K. Mcrton (19681, p. 477. 
j6 T.S. Kuhn (1967). 
'm 
If we look at  rhe Cuban-Spanirh-C.S. triangle, such a patrern of intellectual rcaction remains 
firmly in place, especially since rhe trtongulation remains to a large extent uiiresolved. A hun- 
drcd years after de1iveranc.e froni Spaiii, Cuba rcmains an exceptiuiial political sgstciii within 
Lstin America, stuck in a bitter, ritualizcd iurifrontnrion with {he United Stares. Inrernally, Cu- 
ba has not achievcd a minimum longterrn srahility during rhe Twentieth Century: the republi- 
caii rcgin~r sriirnblcd from revolution to revoluriiiri, and, afrir forty years, Comrnunist rule is 
being watchcd intrrnñtionally in daily expecrance of its iI<iwnfall. As a function of such politi- 
cal experience, pro-Castro partisans and the anti-Castro exilrs arc both fervent nationalists, 
sharing a civic religion tliat worship at the same patriotic shrines and burns incense to the same 
national sainrs, Legiiiiiing wiili thc sinlrss and outstanding Jos6 Martl. In  riirii, Cuban histori- 
ography is univrrsally ii~iionalist, wliatcvcr othcr d i~a~ree tnen t  rnighr divide hisr<rrians, k ir 
Marxism or documentary detail. The  obtisancc [o inheritcd syiriliulogy, of coursc, is justifird by 
the maintenance of a political ciilture of civil war. Any deviation would be treason, accepting 
tlie rnciny, working for Castro or selling-riut tu thc "yanqiit" dollar, and su íorth.37 It is in chis 
natiunalist ronrinuity that the reaffirmation by L.A. Ptrez Jr. of Roig de Leiichsciiritig should 
be placcd. 
The  political and intellectual evolution of Spain, of cotirsc, is not much bitrcr. No need to 
ernpliasize the incapacity of aiiy reprcsentative and integrativz political systein to takc hold ir1 
Spanish socicty throughout rhc Twentiirh Century, given the notoriety rht: Civil War of 1936- 
1939. Nor is it necessary to stress the dcgrer t r ~  which that conflict was a formidable syinbolic 
spectacle for vicarious expiarion, which moved Protestants, Jews and Catholics worldwide, aiid 
presented the intcrnarional battlc of angels and doiils according to the taste of the 1930% in thí: 
adjiisratilc guise of popularfrontists and íuscists (or svsii Soviet syml>athizers and antiStalin- 
ists).jE l'hc "Spanish il~odel" of democratic transition from dicrarorship astounded global opin- 
ion, and was cite.d ar an example in both Larin Amcrica and the Eastcrn bloc sirnply because 
Spaniards did not desrrnd iiito bitter civil fray at the physical end of rhe Franco dirtarorship. 
Nevcrtheless, the extent to which rhc current Spn i sh  political systciii can survivc rciiiains to 
be seen, given the considerable national divisions that persist or even today previal, forrnularcd 
in regional-nationalist terms rival to a tradirional, central State nationalism. Tlie siruation, 
thus, is quitc paradoxical, because, although therr ir a considcrahle unitary Spanish srritirrient 
directed outwardr, towards Europe, Latin Arnerica or thr iritcinational rcenc in general, therr 
is scant agreement internally as to just what being "Spanish" rnraris i ir  should mean. The  ob- 
vious 1~5ult is an iiitensely nationalisr, if contradictory, political culturc, still hurdcned by the 
iihtlc rcmnants of a n  alrriost tuvo-liuiidrcd-year-luW civil war tradition. This, uf r:<iiirse, spills 
over into the historiography, wtii~li burris with nattonalist fcrvur iti various disputitious dircc - 
tiurir. Political affinity and historical reference are stil l  almort irnpossible to separate: as one ob- 
scrver of ilie political sccnc concludcd acutely not too lurig ago, thr main traits that unite the 
warring clziis of thr Spanish left are the professc<l syrripathy for the Castro regimr arid for the 
rebels of the Wrsterii Sahara, both reminders of Spain's las1 rwu coloiiial rtrugglcs in Cuba aiid 
Morocco.Jg 
In contrasi, tiaturally, thc mudelir srahility of [he United States' polirical systern, which -to- 
gethcr with that of tlie United Kingdorn- ha7 hccn used as the basic guidelinr tiy wliich to 
ineasure the rvolution of al1 other democratic-rcprrsentat~ve institutions throughour the wvrld 
j7 The problcm of iurli iiiimohilirm in: M. Pérez Srabie (1998). 
'"E. Ucclay-Da Cal (1999%). 
jY f .  V>lcnzorli (1996). 
during the Twentieth C e n t ~ r y . ~  From time to iirne, contraria" and revisionist argiirnent has 
challengcd siirh a cunfidcnt view of "Airicrican civic cultiirc", insistiiig in tlit. rnlr played by civ- 
il wars (both thc srruggle for ii~dcpendence and the mid-Ninetrciith Century contest) in defin- 
ing U.S. dernocracy, as well as in the pcrrnanint pressurc uf striictural violence as a clcavage at 
social levcls other tlian the insririirional, and, narurally, in the pervasive racism underlying 
American egalitarianism and reasanablencss." The  result is, in retrospcct, a doiible discourse. 
0ii the une hand, American sclf-pride ir so intense as to makc "nationalisrn" (a trrm in and out 
of use sincr 1812) a taboo word, while the presumption is that al1 citizeris are "patriotic", iden- 
tify with thc values of the Constitution. salure the flag that synilrulizes it and feel morally supe- 
rior to others unnble ro share in "Amcrican values". Such an evasion is consequent with rhr 
basically idcological adhercncc implicit in U.S. citizenship, and the interaction of rrprisrnta- 
tinn-participation in thc political sysrerii, as has long been poitited out, especially by foreign po- 
lirical rcientists." On the other liarid, however, there rernains a nagging doubt, a persiatent 2nd 
somewhat puritan giiili ttiat the "American people" has failed in achieving true uiiiry 2nd has 
not been up ro rhe drrnands of irs moral ~ a s k  in the warld. Inrtcad of fulfillirig irs "revolution- 
ary incssage", U.S. society has "iailcd", has bccn intrrnally a citadel of organized injustice 
(against "Native Aniericaiis" and "Afro-i\mericans"), whilc ~xrcrnally abusing other societics 
cspccially "1Iispatiic" in the namc of anti-impeiialiarn. As can be easily inferrcd, Cuba has pro- 
vided aniple ammunition for both the fcrling of superiority, as an exprcssion of a U.S. 
naiiurialist att~rudc (aniorig rccent histr~riography on thc marrrr, say O'T<,olr), and of guilt, ex- 
pressed by assuriiiiig Cubaii riarionalism (say Foncr)." 
Sucli idcological c<iritinuity serves to makr historical ilivolgarion more appealing tu thc gen- 
rral reader as ~ P I I  as rimely, according to the iornings and goings of political fashion or thc 
necds (if factional debatc, Insofar as geopi>lincal facrs rend to be stahlt vvcr great lcngrhs ol time 
("Cuba is 90 nautical miles froni thr Continental United States" ar "Guantanaiiio Bay is a per- 
manent occupation of Cuhan territory"), diplomatic confrontations rcnd to have reiterative sub- 
tcxts, which are tlir heart of mosr nationalist argumentati~ri.~' When a pcriodic "crisis" 
(whatever that meaningless word may signify) raiscs the rclcvance of a particular geopolitical 
setting, academic publications appcar tn takc advantage of the inarket opening, directed at hoth 
a broad consumer audicnce (to makc rnoiiry)or tospecialized publics in governrnenr or cultural 
entities (for promotion). This would explaiii rhe cyclical nature of so much historical writing, 
whicli logically frcdr offupportunity. Bur the high cost of such a dcpendcncy on accidental fac- 
tors rernains ineth~dologicall~ unexplored. For this acridcntalisrn encourages a subordination 
of analysis tn political sympathy, which in turn makes cornrnunication so much easier (it bcing 
a grrat convenicrice to have rcadcrshlp already awarr of the "correct" position, in possrssion of 
the aiiswrr and only waiting for [he riglit iluestion, especially that which mlght rhow up the 
structured falsehood nf al1 opponcrits). And what are such alignmenrs of thc "pulitically corri- 
mi t t ed  (or thc Spanish 'irimprometidoipoIirrzarneníc") huta variant ot tlir I<uhniaii paradigm, 
and a drbased rinr a t  that, insofar as market factors intrudc suflicicntly to irnpede the break- 
rhrough toa new mindset, which is thc oprimistic pai t of Kuhn'r rriudcl? 
" G. Alrnond & S. Verba (1970). 
" For cxariiiilr: H. Zinn (19RO) (un jicri\,e ignorrncc o t  Cuban rcbcli Iiy Arncrcaiii,i Iiistnrians: p. 302). 
"This i s  a clear percrption of Frcnch suriiiliigy of rhe Unircd Srstea, from Tocquevillc on, rhrough F. Roz. in rhc ear- 
ly  Twrntierh Cciiriiry, <o ruch prcrcntdry sprriahrrr as A.  Karpi and E Marienrrrar. 
" O'Tíoole (19841; D S. Poner (19731, vol. 2 
" J .  Alvarcr Dial, A. Arredondo, R.M. Shelton. J. Vizcaíno (19h4); 1. Mrnach (1970). 
If tlie context determines opporrunity 2nd alignnients remain stable, then rhe analysis of in- 
trracrions bctwcen strands of ideology is almost imporsible. Thc  nasty aspect of [he paradigms 
of the "polirically committed" is that they are invisible as surh to tlieir users, being reified. Any 
givcn vicwpoint is much like a design for lighting a given décor. Tlir metaphors irnplicit in de- 
scriptive languagc show this casily: aspects are "focussed" ar  "highlighred" or  "obscured". This 
means rhar al1 axioms have a cost-bencfit basis, making certain relarionships visible whilr hid- 
ing others. The  stability or"politically commitrcd" and nationalistic positions signify that rnariy 
idcological interacrions are never fouiid missing. They cannor be seen from rhe trenches. 
CARIBBEAN CULTURAL INTEHACTIONS 
istorirally, rhc Caribbean basin has acted as a major crucible of cultures bctween various 
conrincnts. It is roiniiionplace to remark on the African infliicncc oii the Americas." Rur H. 
tlie role of Antillean fccdback to Africa -though wcllknown to specialisa- is f a r  Icss commcnt- 
ed.46 Equally the cnormous stimulation rhar Afro-American culture in rh'e U.S. has rcreived 
from beyond thr Culf of Mexico is ofrcn not acknowlcdged, although, again, it is a well sriiíl- 
ied phcnomenon. Even "N&i/ude" is largsly a Caribbean invcntion, extending ro thc U.S. or 
to France and Grcat Brirain, and frurri tliere, "back to Africa": iikrurnah was, at least in part, 
a sclf-avuwed disciplc of Garvcy, Senghur of CCsaire; onc can even rcmembrr thr rolc o f F ~ n o n  
in generating the discourre of Third-World 0p~ression.47 But also European cu l tu r~  was sub- 
ject to a complex hl<iwback cffect from thc Antilles, includiiig such U.S. notions as cariie 
through a tropical route: there ir,  for example, a good case rhat h'inetrenth-Century European 
racism was to a very large degree -ofrrn uiiubserved by Europcanisrs- an Americati iniport.48 
0 1 1  a more sympathctic note, the circular inreraction of niodcrniry in plasric arts and music, 
usually redu~ed to an Atlantic bridge hetween Paris and New York, with some condrscending 
gliinpses of Africa- is ~ ~ ~ i a l l y  incomprehcnsible withour the Caribhean. Iu orher words, if thc 
Caribbcan gavc birrh ro rhc "ta5te reuolution" (swects, dirtilled alcohol and robaccu) of tlie Scv- 
cntecnth and Eighreenth Cenruries in Europe, thrreby firmly cstablishing rhe process of intius- 
trializarion and, ultimatcly, of the mass consurncr socirty, its rnle as one of the major crossroads 
ot cultural ;nformation surroundiiig nioderniry is unchallengeablr.49 The "Islands in the sun" 
migtit tlietnselver rrmain bywarers and evcii "econoinic basket-cascs", to LIS? a famous catcgo- 
ry of Henry Kisaiiiger's~o Lirir rheir role as a criss~cross transn~ission belt, going in niiiltiplc di- 
rections and carrying al1 suris of inixid-iip information is largcly uiiexplored arid iriore than 
important. 
SI>ain was a central prescnce in the C.arititieati uiitil IR%, and Cuba will remairi a connecr- 
iiig line, bark and forth, between the Peninsula antl rhr: vüricty of Larin Amcrica. But, in a d d i ~  
rion, thc Caiibbean was and is nororiously the Unired Srarcs' backyard. Accordingly, 
througbour the Nirictccnth Crnriiry, Cuba served as an unwirting bridgr lor tbe cnrry of 
Prorestani political rhought iriiu Catholic Spain. Much more than anything coming ir1 tlirough 
Cibralrar and crrtainly coiiiparable to the arademir input carried by Spaniards srudying in Ger- 
"For cxaiiiple: S. Siuckey (IOR7), chal?. 1. 
46 As an cnarnplc: R. Edgar (1976). 
" J.A. 1-angley (1974). pr. 4112-41 1; also B. Davidson (198Y), pr. 28~40; L.S. SCnglior (1964). lnfluencr ir underitood hcre 
a5 an innracrion, nor as conrensus: for the bitcer diviiion heiwrrn Garvey and Du Boir. iee: A. Rarnperssd (1990), pr. 
147.155, 
4R R. H o r ~ r n r n  (1985): on the ulrerior influence oIV.S. eugenir, iiii rhe Gcrman Nazi mouernenr: S. Kuh l  (1994). 
'" Sidney V! Minrr (IYX5); W Srhiu~lbusch  (1942). 
50 Scc E. Williarnr (19841, chap. 29;rlsa G.K. I.ewir (1967)~ 
man universities, the link to the U.S. through Cuba servrd to introducr rrrcadingr ot h'eo-Clas- 
sical discoiirse i i i  dcmocratic garb in other tlian the lastest Frcnch cut of fashioii, as well as to 
siistain thc intcraction between fundamental debares on political stiucturrt, auch as thr discus- 
sion bcrween federalisrn arid unitarism, conrraporing the Soutli Arrierican republics to the er- 
perience of the sciiiur republic of thr hcrnispherc. Accordiiigly, al1 the lessoos learned in Cuba 
fiotii Soutlicrn C.S. sourccs -about sclf-detcrrriiriarion as a fundamental right, about nullifica- 
tion asan advanccd interpretatioii of federal practice- ultimatcly made their way to inetropoli- 
tan polirics in peninsular Spain." The Cuban U.S. link was also a complex exrliaiigc, richer 
and dreper ovcr tiiiie rhan is often realized. Beyond thc principie of "Athciiiari dcrnocracy" ex- 
crcised by cirizrns above slaves, the most cxtreme Southerii ductrines - of allegcd 'iroblejir 
oblige" and, mosr especially, of thc cult of "durllo" and "punctillio"- had a distiiictly Hispanic 
r i i rn . a  South Carolina, nororiourly thc hcart of Southcrn "fire-eating" doctrinc, had in fact 
been dominatcd from its iiicc)iiii,ii by colonists from British Uarbadus, who rstahlishcd a sricial 
pattcrn hased on tlir F.iiglish rereading ofold Spanish slavcowner r ~ i l e s . ~ ~  Now, iii yct anorlier 
laycr of thc Caribbean palirnpsest and excliaiigc, thcsc idras returncd to Cuba as advaricr<l so 
cial thrnry, a drearn of agrarian access to ~a~ i t a l i s rn  a d thc world rnarker, in wliicli werr equal- 
ly mixed hoth an aristocratic pretcnsion, with i r s  admiration for the individual literally "of good 
brecding" or "good s tock ,  and an aggrcssivs individualisni h r n  in North Arnerica of tbe rcv- 
olutionary niarriage of rclrctic Proteslantism, participatory instirutions of worship and goverii- 
nieiit, arid thc "honzo eco~orriici*~" of uiifettcrcrl <:conomic rrade. Hcady sriiff, which toril< <,ff i n  
al1 dir~rrions, Icadiiig to the dreairia fiir "lone~star" annexatii~n to rhe I2.S. on tlir 'ikxan pattcrn 
or, at worbr, l o r a  "special relntionihip" to the Dccp S o ~ i r h . ~ ~  Aftcr ilir defrat of thc Confeder- 
x y  i r i  1865,Culiari scparatism took a mtirc opportunistic ariil, at the samc time, a more idealia- 
tic turii, loriking increasingly to Afro-Cuban sulipnrt, while the rise of "~ipañoIiiino" or 
"incondicionnliimo" -the new Spanish natiiirialirrn of identity- found its social hasc in thc iiniiii- 
grants frorn the Peninsula who wrrr dcpriving the free Blacks of an economir rolc5T 
Thur, thr risc of Ciiban scparatism, whether annexatiunist or indepcndciitist, was directly 
hiiilt upon idcor rrcrived from "Diuie", and this included -as also happciird in tlie ü.S.- class 
interaiiiuns in which ideals of social bchavior wrre crosscd iii surprising ways, nr>t to be ex- 
plored here'b The  core message was r h ~  idcal uf rullccrivc individualism, expressed as thc in- 
alienable right to self dctermination, bastd on a racial irid/or difference so scriiiiis as to be 
impossible to ovcrcomr withaut intolerable humilliation.J7 This was a positive mrssagc, with a 
sensc of juridiral dactrine, which travelled backwards, rhrough the immigrant-"indiuno" route- 
hack to Spain, to set off the iiew nationalisrns that arose between 1885 aiid 1895 in Catalonia, in 
the Basquc Counrry, in the Canary Islands, in Gal~cia, and eveii omong rhe Filipino students in 
tlic colonial tiiclropolis (from whencc to Pñrific archiliiclagi,).58 
Alitiough the connection is only heing nr>w iiivrstigated, ir is more thsn likely that fiiriire rc- 
search will point to rhr major rolc Iil;~yrd by Freemasonry in this sustaincd parrrrn of comrriu- 
E. L'cclay-Da <;al (1997). 
J'For thc idea of "Herrenvolk dcmocrscy". G.M. Fríderickion (l9Ri). I n  ~ e n e r a l :  K.S. Greenberg (19851, erpccially 
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nication. European federalism (dcaliiic the idiosyncratic case of Switzerlaiid), was esrcntially 
groundrd in the "dynastic principle" ratlicr ihan in thc contrary "democratic" or "na~ioiialist 
priiiciplc" (to use thc political language of the 1840s aiid 1850s).J9 For purposes of partirion or 
division sovreignty rrcidcd in the prince, rathcr [han in tlir ,icoplc, a major convenience for rlie 
estahlisliment of dividcd sovreigntics, aucli as rnarkcd the ongiiirig partirion of the Ottornan 
Empire or the Unificatiun o€ Gcrrnany. On tlie contrary, ir was in the North American exam- 
plc that popular sovreignty had justificd, emblcmatically in 1776, the separation of tcrritorics 
from their here-to-forr rule of king and parliarnent. This model had. in essence, deterniincd 
ilie evolution of independent Srntcs tiroken off lrotn thr Spanish Crown from Mexico to thr Ar- 
grntirlr, despite the confusion with Frciich constitutional langiiagc of siniilar contcnr but dif- 
Fcring form." rxobinism hñd the allurr of iis physical cuiifiontation to thc Roinan Catholic 
tradition, bu1 the rrñl rcvolutionary practice in thi. whcilc of Latiri Ariicrica rarnc justified frorn 
sources with a deeper emrtity tu IJapist valucs, as traditionalists were nut blow to arguc.6' 
Ari easy route for reaching fedrralism, therefore, would he the practice of Frceinasonry, an- 
rl-Catholic (even philo-Protestant), antt-monarchical, but much given the recognition nf au- 
tonomits and such-like territorial relatioiialiips.Q C~ertainly, within the lberian Peiiinsula, the 
corrimunication between Portuguese and Spaninti lnrlgrs argueably was an outsrandin~ instru- 
rriciit for dealing with the contradictions of rising 2nd miiriially hostile nntionalisms and witli 
the simiiltaiieous doctrinr of a commciri Ilierian unity, scparare hrir equal.63 Spanish tradition- 
alists had no doiiliu but that the "brorherhoods" were bchind thc downfall of the Mainland and 
had threatened the "Musr Loyal Irland" rhroughout thr rest of rhe Ninctcenrli Crntury6"here 
would bc no problem in "fraternal" rclations hrtween Cuhan and U.S. rnaauos. Although 
Fr~rrnasonry was strong in the fedrralisr North, Confrdrrate leadcrsliip also had an irnpurtant 
Masuiiic following: witncss "the Arkansas philosopher" Albirr Pike, journalist, poet, and self- 
sryled Sanskrit scholar, hooking up the Cherokee Six Nationr in Oklahoma to the Southern 
cause using such a rhetoriral line of diplomatic connecriiiri LO Native American c0uncilr.6~ Log- 
ically, he re  was intcnsc "fraternal" interaction between thr Irid#cs of rhc Antillcs and tht. 
Peninsula, arid, by extension, much to thr scandal of rightwing catholir syrripathizcrs in Spain, 
thr risr of Filipino riatioiialisin would have a cnnsistent Masonic colorarion, right down to the 
Katipunan66 
Tu sum up, relf-dirrrmination -uf iiidividuals (¡.e. dcrnorracy), and by extcnsion, of a dem- 
ocraric territory with "special rharacteristics" that needcd particularist definition as regarded 
representative insrirutioiis- carne from the intense debate over slavc trrritory and frccsoil in 
Unitcd States to Cuba, anrl, iroiii there, to Eiiropean Spaii,. Freen~asons, wirh tlirir rndc stress- 
ing individual and collective righrs, ~lieir hostility to everythiiig re~resented by the l 'hrnne- 
~p 
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Andres Gallego (1971). 
2nd-Altar alliancc, and their ductility surruunding capitalicm and its social forms, would have 
been an ideal transmission belt, and it is therefore not surprising rhat Catholics, traditionalists 
and righrists in Spain made 3 special puint of denooncin~ thcir alleged sinister rolc as thc "hid- 
dcn hand" bcliirid imperial downfall, no to  rncntiori rcvolurion and the thrcat of "red" Rcpuh- 
licñnism ai I~orne.6~ That  Spanish righrisrs beiairie addicted to a conspiracy theory aiid uffered 
Iittle elsr by way of explanation does not mean, however, that they wcre neccssarily mistakeii in 
inuch of their tactical perceprion of their inrmy, merely thar thcir capacity ularialysis arid rheir 
imagiriation were quite I~mited, arriong other reasons, by their propagatida needs. 
THE "WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY" 
oreovrr, in arldirion, the res1 political powrr coiiteiit was not cnrried by thc pnsitive  mes^ M sagc o1 . '  rrlf-detcrminatioii corriing into (and out  of) Cutia, hut rather by thr negarivr rnes- 
sagc. Afrer al], the posirive code only estahlished rhe righr ro separate. It was the negatiuc that 
carried the all-important rcason for s~paration. This was a historical argumenr, nlteri rxpressed 
rriure in literary or visual imagcs, than in absuacr rerms. But it had whar, at the rime was coii- 
sidcrsd a scientific formulation: what tlic English analyst of science and  historiography Hcrbcrt 
Butterfield has farnoiisly and ciitically characterized as thc "Whig iiitcrpretarion of Hi~tory". '~ 
11s exponenrs woiild hc such outstanding (or notorious) cxanipler o€  historical style and rhrory, 
as T.B. Macaulcy or Buckle, anxious to frame "English Civilization" in 3 cumparativc rontext. 
T h e ~ r  ideas were quickly picked and secondirl by more popular British historians, such as 
Grcen. Arguirig f«r an "Anglo-Saxon" community of values, othcrs in rhe Unirrd States, such 
as .Morley on rhe Dutch Revolution, or Bancroft and Parkman used the same frarnework ex- 
tendirig i r  to the Norrh Amcrican contcxt.6~Troiii liere, it was but a short S L C ~  ro the school- 
hooks in both countrics.70 Hriefly pur, rhe "Whig inrerprctarinn of Hisrory" stated that the 
English had originatcd representative governmenr, building ripon Germanic habits, when the 
barons imposed parlianient on King John with the "Magna Carta" ar R ~ n n ~ m e d e . ~ '  The Eng- 
lish Rcformation, going heyoiid the accidental dynasiic r:irrumstances of the Tuhirs, had tic- 
cornr a vast ~ollecrive, evcri national, movrment 1Lr representative governmcnt. tiventually, rhe 
parliamcntary cause had even taken on thc Crown, when Stuart kings misrnkcnly abused the 
fundamental rights of "free-horn Englishmen"; the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 had becn the 
culniinatioii of such a proccss in thc ir>stirutionalization of liherty. Uut iliis procesL was really 
soriicthing that pcrtaincd to al1 the "English.speaking peoplcs". Tlir Scots Iiid also lived thcir 
Reformation and had joined with [he English to form a I%ritisli union. The  English (and Scot) 
colonist in North America had stood up for their riglits wirh [he same spirit and wirc thus a 
continuation o( such a broad "Aiiglu~Saxon spirii uf freedorn". i-,ven, to a IPSSCT dcg~r \s ,  rhe 
h t c h  Iiñd somcrhing of the same firc, as it liad Leeii their strugglc to be rid ulSpanish op- 
presaion thar had shown thr way of tlir future, although modern Holland harl iiot quite lived 
u p  t<i the racial promise exhihited in more gl<irioun times by its peoplc.72 
Thus. the "Whig inrcrpretatioii oCHisrory" effectively comhin~d iiationalism, paii-riational- 
ism, religious patriotism witIi a hisrorical vision, on a broad srale of the fall of fi-udalism, rhc 
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rise of capitalism, and the healthy distance established by the defenders of civil rights between
themselves and the bane of Romanism. 73 Originally, at the end of the Seventeenth Century, in
the times of "good King Billy" and, later on, in the heyday of the Whig Establishment, the
"Whig interpretation of History" was a delicate operation in ideological and historical manip-
ulation, designed to help balance through propaganda the unsteady foundations of the English
throne. But it became a useful tool for defining the British national cause against Bourbon
(therefore Romanist France) and especially against the "pagan" revolutionaries and the mili-
taristist threat of "Boney". The colonists in British North America happily used the same Whig
repertoire to justify their self-determination; left without the French as an effective enemy by
their elimination from Canada and Lousiana after 1763, their sense of the living presence of Pa-
pist tyranny became centered on Spain, which made up the major part of the new United States'
terrestrial and maritime borders." The longterm re-elaboration of such arguments was not dif-
ficult, as the "Whig interpretation of History" was eminently adaptable to the restrictive taste
of Romanticism.
In fact, the starting point to such ideals lay already in early German Romanticism, in which
both the young Goethe (Egmont) or Schiller (as playright Don Carlos, as historian, on the Thir-
ty Years' War) expressed a similar viewpoint. In its English version, extensible, as we have seen,
to North America and even to the Dutch, the "Whig interpretation of History" had established
the national and religious enemy as Spain, identified with the hegemonic project of Philip II,
with the Inquisition as a fearsome backdrop." After all, seen in this perspective, the Spanish
king had been the driving force behind the strident recatholization of his wife "Bloody Mary".
Accordingly, the "battle of England" incarnate in the "Sea Rovers" and the defeat of the Great
Armada was a moral deliverance from a bloodthirsty opponent who had already exhibited un-
wonted cruelty in the conquests of Mexico and Peru, and, with the Duke of Alba, had export-
ed such brutality to the Low Countries, as was shown by the "rape of Antwerp". All lovers of
liberty could not but celebrate the decadence of Spanish power, brought about no doubt by the
exertions of the Americas, which weakened and ultimately exhausted the Spanish race in its
overweening rush for world power. French propaganda, especially the school of libellists estab-
lished by Cardinal Richelieu against Spanish power systematized and standardized what until
then had been a sequence of disparate texts, from Las Casas on the Destruction of the Indies (es-
pecially in De Bry's illustrated version), to Foxe's Book of Martyrs, to Antonio Perez or "Regi-
naldo Gonzalez Montano" or Dutch war propaganda, notably the printbook of the illustrator
Willem Baudart and the princely denunciations William of Nassau, all aimed against Philip II.
The French poison pen specialists -perhaps in part as an expression of Hugonot patriotism in a
collective, national cause- pulled together all the accusations, mixed racy incest with sexy sado-
masochism, corruption with torture, rape with martyrdom, all bathed in a moral glow, and so
effectively demonized Spanish absolutism.76
By the end of the reign of Louis XIV, although the propaganda pressure against Spain was
no longer needed in France, the southern neighbor had become a standard metaphor for abu-
sive government and the brutal exercise of repressive ideological warfare, and accordingly be-
came the easy way for French polemicists to avoid censorship by the simple expedient of talking
73 L. Colley (1994).
74 See B. Bailyn (1992); H. Bernstein (1965); also P.W. Powell (1971).
75 In general: W.S. Maltby (1971); P.W. Powell (1971); C. Gibson (ed.) (1971).
76 J.M. Jover (1949). More recently: M. Mechoulan (1985). V.I. Salavert (1990); M.A. Visceglia (1995). For context: J.K.
Sawyer (1990).
about Spain whcre 811 readers understood Frenih rirruinstanccs. Th r  Enlighterirnent, in turn, 
radiating oiit from France, spread the idcntificatiun ofdecadence witli Spain throughout al1 
ciiltured Europe, especially to plarrq whcrc ir rnighr not otherwisr have reachcd.77 In Great 
Brirain or the Low Countries, tlie obvious conrinuity of rnetaphor rhroiigh thc Scvenrerrith 
Century into the Eighteeiith rcquired no furthsr rcpetition. Thiis Spain became conrolidated 
in the idealogical origin of modcrnity as the failed anragnnist of al1 progress, cffecrivi as a dom- 
inanr mrtaphur up ro those areas tliat rnight prefer to use the "Gicat Turk" as a preferahle ex- 
rcration oichoice. The evidcnt exceptions wcrc, of couisc, S~iain, but also Austria, since the 
discourse had liad vigency in Norrhrrn Germany arriong opponents of the Habshurg cause 
through al1 thr devastation of the Thirty Years' War and afrer, right through to rhe "Stiiriii urid 
Drang", as indicared ahove. 
Since rhe majar continental oplionrnr of rhe Frcnch Revolution was i i i  fait Austria, and it 
was again the 1 Iabrburg wliich imposed a "Metternichian peari" on Eurupc afrer rhc Congros 
of Vicnna io 1815, al1 Romantic protest, in the defcnsi <if 60th rcprcsenrarive and ioristitution- 
al governmrnt and of "the oppressed pcoples", was abovc al1 directed against i1ic dynasry. Siirh 
aiiti-EIahshurg ditamation could pick up thr tradition of the young Goethr and Schiller and, in 
general, northcrn, Protcstant, ruspicions, of Southern, Catliolic hcgemony. Hut. for example, in 
the German Confcderatiriii, after rhc Carlshad deci-ees iii 1819, ir hrrnmc cxprdient to avoid C X ~  
plicit political disiiirsion of Austrian or Ilahsburg interrsts.7~ Similarly, in rhe I~alies, Austrian 
hcgeinoiiy arid shared anti-revol~tionar~ interest on thc part of othcr rulers, lerl to similar cen- 
sorsliip. The  "Whig interpretatiori of History" was tlius tailor-made, since it offered appeals to 
freedom and representarivc, constirutional gourrninent, in line with rhe leadcrship of Britirli 
cmpiricist hi~totiu~raphy,  whlch was sticcifically dirccr~d against the nppression of Hal,rliorg 
Spain, a political enriry out o1 txistcnce for rncirc than a century. Gcrman and Iialian narional- 
ibt litcrat~irr -not only liistoriojirapliy was thus viciously anti-llabrbiirg, ;ir Spanish cxpense: 
say, as an cxaiiiple, Manzoiii, I p ~ o m e s s i s p i  (18271, htir Vcrdi'r grand opera Don Carlos (1867) 
dcnouiicing Philip 11 for a multirude of crimes would stand as well.79 The referente to Spanish 
udiousness was so standard a romantir recourse tlior rhe Belgian revolution of 1830 brgan nftcr 
aii oprr:i prformance which cxalrcd the Nrapolitan rcvolt against Syiaiiish tyranny in 1640.80 
Rclgian political culturr wsr tlierr;lftrr sustained by this syiribolic loathing: thc prirric work, 
which sct off Flemish literatiirr, was Hendrik Consciente's In'r woiidevaai 1566 (1837); Chirles 
dc Cosrcr bcgan Relgian lirerature in French with Ler aucntulei de Ti11 Eulenspeipl (1859, full 
vrrsion 1867), full nf cheerful references to "IaraignCe noir dc I 'E~cur iuI" .~~  Much of Spanish 
ptai:tirr seemed to reaffirm in detail any siich pcrrpeciivc of moral condemnation: how fitting, 
for example, given thc dcgree ro whirh abolitionisiii was a milirant Protcstanr Evangcliiol 
cause, that Spain in Cuba should Iic iicarly rhe last allegedly civilizcd country in thc late Nine- 
teenth Century (savr Hrazil) tu ahandon slavrry.a2 
The  Spanish reply, up to the present, has been rcsentful indignarion and deep denial, in a 
fierrrly natioiialisr toiie: it was al1 just a vast conspiracy of lies, Iwrn of malicious envy, a merc 
"Ulack Legend", as the conser\,ativc Spanish diploiiiai and journalisr Julián Juderias surnmrd 
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it al1 up in ttic early Twcnriíth Cciitury.8J Ey an invertcd argumrnt, Spain was aflirtncd to he 
morally superior to al1 its iiationalisr cncrriies and to the frir<:rs that kept reducirig ir tu a trivial 
forcc in intcrnarional affairs.8' Thus, we can see a first demonstration of sclf-fulfilliiig prophc- 
cy, on both sdes of the "Black Lcgend"/Spanish nationalist divide.#' Evrn today, Ciiban na- 
rionali*tr can still cxplicirly siirvcy tbeir battlcgroiind with the U.S. in sur:li t c r r n ~ . ~ ~  
C U B A N  I N D E P E N D E N C E  A N D  SELF-FULFILLIh'G PROPHECIES 
N eedless to ,ay, in the Nineteenth Cenrury, anybody wirh a grudgc againsr Spanish power could ger evcn rriorr legitimitation by floggiiig thc dead horse of Spanish hc~ernony. It 
was a readymade argument, with al1 thc trimmings, which only nrcded the small addition of 
rernarking that tlie heasr was not drad yct, but was in facr a <lariger [o rome or otber liherty-lov~ 
irig opponcnts. The arguincnt carricd wirh it a full historical jiisriíication, adaptable to almost 
any circumstanrc. Ir served lo specifiy any ulipnncnt's goal ot repr~scriiative sclf-govcriiinent. 
religioiis frccdom, civil rights for individuals, ai wrll as an implicit adhcrcncc to the values of 
cconoinic mtidcrnity, Ninereenrh-crntury sryle. If Hahshurg rule was the negation of capital- 
ism -bcgun (if rrriiotely) with rhe expulsion uf rhc rews ir i  1492 and capped with that of rhe 
Moriscos in 1609-161 1, iliat is, in this perspective, Spain's only \,iral candidates for <lefenders of 
thr values of an active work ethic- rhcn rhe negation of rhr Habsburgs was the affirmation of 
ccoriomic progrcss, savings, hard work, puncr~iality, 2nd so forrh. 
Such tliernrr werc firmly in place iri Portuguese Romanticistn, well awarc since the begin- 
ning of the ccritliry of thc ')c~igo eipznhrd" (with a Spanish invasioti in 1800 and a subscquent 
territorial loss rhar zurviucd thc general resrrrlcirieiit of 1815). Catalari parricularism, horn with 
Romanticisiii, madc a conrisrcnt effort to recovcr rlic rneaning of Spairi', history al an inhcr- 
rntly artificial Srate, borii of abrolutism, an oppressor of riaiiuns, and liberal riovelists (alttioiigh 
writing in Spanish) such a Victor Balaguer, among others Iess talented, increasingly comhiried 
sccnaiios based on the 1640 revolt ofttie Catalans with insistente ori the opprobriurii of Span- 
ish riilc, espccially as left liberals becamc disilliisioned with conserv>tivc rule under Isabel 11 
and clamnred for dcriiocratic chanyc: iior accidcntally, the 1868 revolt thar ovcithrrw the Queen 
was officially rirlrd a "Gloriaus Kevolution", as an inteiirinnal, cxplicit echo <if the W h ~ g  : r i ~  
umph of 1688 in England."' Even rhe Spanizh republican tradition, using a vaguely Carriltan 
rrginnalisr discourse, tried to cliinb on what was cvidenrly a general view of how to hest assess 
Spain. Ikpublicans idcalized rhe "Comunero" revolt of tlie towns a~niiist he Emperor Charles 
V in 1520-1522 as the expression of native prnrcst against tlic imporitivn of fnrcign, "German" 
- 
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absolutism. It was not much of an argument, but it was the reason why Spanish republicanism
claimed a tricolor, adding a purple band to the State nationalist yellow-red in honor of the old
Castilian ensign and the liberal values of representative rule it allegedly embodied.88
Of course, no one could more effectively use the "Whig interpretation of History" against
Spanish rule than Cuban separatism. More than any other Nineteenth-Century opponents of
Spanish governance, they were closest to an audience which thrilled at the repetition of Whig
verities, which was of course the United States. Their first ideological necessity was to establish
themselves as a separate people, not as Spanish rebels, but as Cuban nationals under the oner-
ous Spanish yoke, struggling for freedom on the model of U.S. independence. 89 Cuban revolt
was consistently based on a frontier strategy, from Narciso Lopez in 1850 to Jose Marti in 1895:
the use of the nautical border between the U.S. and Spanish Cuba. With some Eastern Seaboard
port as a jump-off point from neutral territory, expeditions could charter a boat, load it with
guns, embark with bold rebels and make steam for or sail for the island with the intention of
eluding Spanish naval patrols, then landing and sparking off a revolt which would, eventually,
lead to a general revolution. 90 If the pressure of broad-scale insurrection against the Spanish
military were not sufficient to guarantee victory, the unavoidable destruction of property be-
longing to U.S. citizens, as well as the uncomfortable proximity of Cuban war to Florida, would
hopefully, sooner or later, lead to North American intervention. Given the U.S. insistence in
buying the island, by both Democrats and Republicans, before and after the Civil War, such ac-
tion would most certainly not be advantageous to Spanish interests.
Cuban rebels thus had a consistent interest in winning the propaganda war against Spain in
front of U.S. audiences, more than even defeating the Spanish army in the field, which in any case
was a much harder proposal. Winning U.S. hearts and minds meant tolerance for "filibusterism"
(that is organized revolt from U.S. territory), even money for the cause, and perhaps even legal
support in the case of capture by Spanish authorities, ever ready with the firing squad (as in the
famous "Virginius" case in 1873). 91 Furthermore, Nineteenth-Century America was a fervently
Protestant country, suspicious, North and South, Republican and Democrat (at least in the South)
of Romanism, easily seen, as in Republican Thomas Nast's famous cartoons of the 1870s as an in-
vasion of horizontal bishop-crocodiles, ready to gobble up hardwon liberties and Whig values.
After all, would not the Roman Pontiff in 1899 explicitly condemned the heresy of "American-
ism" (i.e., the pattern of religious lassitude or even indifference that can accompany an excessive
enthusiasm for the implications of progress, especially in the optimistic United States)?92
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92 In an apostolic letter Testem benevolentice (1899), Leo XIII stressed that several outstanding errors, although they could
also be found elsewhere, were characteristic of U.S. parishoners or advocated to encourage proselytsm and greater inte-
gration in Americn culture; primarily these were: that spiritual direction is now less needed than in the past; that the
natural virtues must be esteemed above the supernatural, and active virtues above the so-called passive ones; that the
vows of religious life were not in accordance with the requirements of human progress. D. Attwater (ed.) (1949), p. 20.
Such "errors" coincided roughly with U.S. Protestant fears (many were reminded of the critique of modernism and lib-
eralism in the "Sylabus of Errors" of Pius IX in 1864). Specifically, WASP and Whiggish apprehensions were strongly
nativist: that American Catholics were bound by a greater loyalty to a foreign sovreign (i. e. the Pope) than to their pre-
sumably naturalized citizenship, that they could be thereby (in Teddy Roosevelt's later phrase) "hyphenated Ameri-
cans", that Catholics actively required exceptions in their case to the separation of Church and State, and, finally, that
Catholic values held the soul in thrall in contrast to the free choice, both rational and emotional, of the reformed spirit.
08
1 Acting in consequence with the demands of their most importan1 exteriial audicnce, thc 
Cubaii rebels set up a functional propaganda axis hetwccn Tampa (the closest city to Ciiba i r i  i < Florida and thc poirit frurri wliicli publicity directed at Cubans could be ernittcd) and New York, which hecarne thr rffccrive cenrer of thc scparatist rrioveriietit and the stagc from which 
thc Whig iririsage agaiiist Spanish opprcrsion, rnrriiptton 2nd harbarism could he proriioied tu 
an Ainerican audiencc more than willing to Iistin.YJ Only cerrain Catholic circles -including 
part of Germari irnrnigraiit or Irish opinion- might have some reticente, alrhniigh rhat could be 
overcnrnc if opporrunism really heckoned, as happened in 1898.94 The inajor intellectual figures 
of Cuban separatism s u c h  as, of course, Marti- dedicared rheir time and effort to keep the pub- 
licity rnill churning. Cirilo Valverde, author of the outstanding Cuban novel nf rhe Ninetrenth 
Ccntury Cecilia Valdés (1882), hasically spent his life (horn in 1812, but exiled from 1849 to 1894) 
~n Nrw York riinning thc propaganda show for thc successive Cuba  junta^.'^ 
This disrourae bad rnany natural advanragrs. Thc  poor, ~ n a r t ~ r e d  Cubans (Spanish admin- 
istrarion was undoubtedly nor light) wcrc easily portrayed as haplrn virtiins of the cruel Span- 
ish dons, as anxious for innocent blood as wrre Corres' conquirtadorcs, as grrrtly for rheft as 
Alba's miniorih, always ready to ravish any maiden casr in rheir path. Thus al1 the brurit oCscv- 
eral centuries of denunciation could be brouglit tu bear, witliout iiiuch need for imaginatiun, as 
the receiving piihlic a l r~ady knew what ir was going tu discover. In this sense, Cuhan propa- 
ganda was similar to pornography, not rnerily in ronrrnr, hut in its appeal to a constant de- 
rriaiirl, i r i  this case the Puritan titllation of viciour monks, corriipt grandees, and such like, 
which, especially for Norrhcrri audicrires, could be rnergcd tu the image of Simon Legrcc and 
thc worst of the plantarion bosses.96 Decadrnr Spain, piiffc<I witli pre~ensioiis tu a rank long 
sincc lost (a criticism nut lost on bclievers in "self-made men"), whnse cnllnpsr was rliic ti> a 
priest-ridden, superstitious socicty given to displays of organized cruelty (from the "auto da fe 
(sic]" to the brillfighr), was as distant as the moon frorn any cconomic take-off such as that 
Americanr had rarricd out, as its leaders and very pcople lacked the skills idcntificd with de- 
velopincnr. Spain represented empty honor and rcal violciice, theirfoie dereir and cunning, as 
opposed tu sociability, hard work, persistcnce. Northerners could scc cverythirig dcspi~able in 
1 the South in Cuba, whilc Soutlicrriers (outside Lousiana) could see a distasteful Papist backwa- 
rcr rhar should have been part of the U.S. long ago. Iri this seiisc, witiiess tlie outrage at "hutch- 
er" Wcyler, a rral figurc who was a perfect k i t  for a readymade discoursc. Ratlicr tliari a 
harkward "cruel don", Weyler, howcvrr hnrsh, was rcally a modcrn militaryman engaged in 
rough counrerinsiirgcncy, usiiig rlic best incthod of thr timr.y7 Hut his actions in Cuba crcated 
a stir in the U.S. that was not comparable t<i rhe murh milder indignatioii over Kitchener's sim- 
ilar techniques applied tu Boer guerrillas in South Africa. On the orhcr hand, in France, for ex- 
ample, Weyler did not provoke the disgust that the British did some four years later, simply 
- berause of the anger over rhe "humiliation" of Fachoda ernbodied in the same Kitchener.Y.Y 
SPauish piopagaiida tried inneffertivrly to coiinrrr such a succcssful barrage with a hasical- 
ly racist proposition: if thc srparatists wun, theii Cuba -the largert, mosr drvilriped island in thc 
P Caribbcaii- \i,ould becotiie another sinkhole like "niggcr" Haiti, a runiinoii theme shared by 
qjG.W. Auxirr (1939). 
* Fol rlie irnportancc of thc rcligiour prcsr: J.W. Frvrr (n. d.). 
9* J.  Lsrnorr (1992). 
96 For thr idca of Protcrtanr pornography, rec R .  Hofiradcr, "The Paranoid Sryle ...", (1967). 
97 G. Cardona ai J.C. Lorada (1997). 
q8 In gcncral, rec: P Magnul (lCj6M); snd. as a corrective ro europcentrirm: D.L. Lewii (1987). 
American and Europcan racism. A consisteiit effott was iriadc tu '~arhrush" thc rcbcl causr, 
showiiig it always a> reprcsciiicd by hcstial Africans, with rhick grinning Iips, hig rerrh, subhu- 
mans of the worst rank. In metropolitan Spatn, chis dcrogotory "niggcr" irnage was coupled to 
baiting rhr U.S. as sn lnh~rcnrly piggirh soriety, without any honor, lying, churlish, uncivil, 
rude, in short, the usual rtcreotypes directed, in the tirst half of rhc eightccii-hundrcds, by ro- 
phirticated Europeaiis at tlie crude "Joriathan" (symbol in Rrirain of rhc U.S. before the end of 
ttir Civil War). Thus rhe explosion of patriotic fervor in Spain at [he menace of war with the 
"pnquii" in 1898, as well as [he outbreak of hostilities, was celebrated with an absolutcly unrc- 
alistic explosion of derision at the "hog butchcrs of Chicago", with the conviction that such 
hackward typcs could never confront men with centuries of rxpeiienre in waifarr at their 
backs.99 Naturally, nobody was silly enougli to t r y  io SCII tliil irriage tu an American political 
niarket: in hct ,  ilic very whiffuf such ideas, more or less politely expressed in a Spanish diplo- 
mar's privatc letter, stolen and publicizcd by the Cuban propaganda outfir, served ro heigliten 
war fury in rhe U.S.'" Spanisli propagaiida io Nortli Ariirricari puhlics, tlius, as u ~ u l d  happen 
a decade aiid a lialflaicr tu tlie Gerrnans during World War 1, was in extreme unsuccessful, al- 
though the inherent racist message was well understood and sharcd by opinion rnakerr. Th r  
perceived racism cvcn cncouraged a noticeablc lrvel of African-Amcrican volunteers, to tlie 
general approval a f  "progressive" whites sucli as Teddy Ruusevcl~. 
In pie-war vio-Cubari propagarirla, rhr Ciihans app~arrd  as a unity poor,  slighrly dusky 
C.tiha- 2nd as nnriiral victims, since [he whole conceptual package defined their role quitc neat- 
ly. However, never, dcspite al1 the enthusiasrns of "yellow" journalisn~ (and that includes, be- 
yond Hearst and Pulitzcr, thc illustrated prcss, such as the republican Pul (  n r  the dcrnorrarir 
Judge), were Cubans turncd into rcal slihlerth, os opposrd to oblertr. In otlirr wurds, thr Cubans 
had significanri oiily as ohlectr at the riirrry ulSpariiih wrath, hut thcy never could hecome 
bubjrcts u l  a Prurestanr ideal thar was quite sponraneously racisr. From a WASP perspective, 
perhaps especially for rhe anri-imperialists, Cuba as symholic matron was represerited as a pret- 
ty "octorooii", a "mulatta" who could "ya,, for white", but clearly was not so.'O' 
The propaganda succeeded far roo well. U.S. intrrvenrlon, whcrhcr nreded or not, finally 
decided thr oiircomf. Riir whcn the "had, decadent Spaniards", with al1 their cruclty, had beeii 
booted out, North Amcrican opinion could not inuster mush syinpatliy fur thr: Cubans, who in- 
rtantly becarne nierc "little riiggers", full of noise and incapahle of taking care of rhemselves. 
Srrn close iip, hrretofore abstract Cubans revealed themselves to be a mix of the worst WASP 
fears: ahundantly Black, miscegenated, IIispanic, and Catholic, with an emerging political cul- 
ture based on thirty years' of sustained civil war, a11 told cnough to pul1 rogether Rorri~n Yan- 
kees and Southcrn Dixiccrnts in shiiddcrs ofdisrñrtr a r  rhr rraditional prospect of aniiexatioii.'0' 
Fiirrhcrmorr, inrrrar~d status as a great powcr madc Aiiicricaii pulicy ever more orirnted to- 
waidr questioiis, rcal or ~iiadc-up, of national securiry, with a political uiiconscious curiously 
uhsrsssd with fears of invasion ni secret atrack.'"3 Accordirigly, Cuba w;is placed in a discrete- 
ly coloiiial situatiuii, firsi, uridcr U.S. military administration, and then under an effectivc pro- 
tcctorate, which allowed the "restless nativcs" thcir agitatcd polirics arid fiirrnal indrprndencc, 
- -- 
9gC:. García Barcón (1974) 
'""C. Robles Muiior (1988). lis. LL?-KK;  í :  Ki~hlcs Muiioi (1990); r l i o  rhe arricler by M.C. Seoane sr J. Alvarez Jtinco in 
F. V i l l i r r r d c  ( r d )  (1998). 
'"C. Larch (1958). 
' O r  R.E Werron (1972), chap 5 .  I n  grniral ,  scc the explicitly raclrt irgurnenr of Lurhrop Sroddard (1981). chap V. Ar 
rhc time, Sroddard war tnkcn scrinuriy asan  anrhropologisr. 
' O 3  J. Chace & C. Carr (1988). 
but kept their problems at a distance. With the assurance of a naval base at Guantanamo, the 
anxicties of the gcopoliticians and othcr playcrs of stratcgic war gamcs, such as Mahan, were 
iieatly calmed. Cuba rherehy hecarne "a nice placc ta viszt, but you wouldn't want to live there", 
by having it surnehuw iiisertcd irito tlic Uiiited Statei. Iri iriarked coiitrast to a Cuba charactrr- 
ized by unending civil strife throughout the second half of thc Nincteenth Ccntury, "Porro Ri- 
co" was a quiet place, inanifestl~ less Black in social coloration, which could be calmly 
contemplated as a colony in "America's Barkyard", without foresceiiig any pernicious racial 
hlowback, at least in the short rerrn.'nVhe Rcpublic of Panama, invented out of Colombia's 
isthrnian provincc in 1903 by Arncriran irnpcrial Iegcrdcrnain, was sustained by the same U.S. 
discourse: self-dctcrmination as the prizc for a seccionist rnovrrnent with a long tradition, and, 
iri crirriliciiaatiiiii, a U.S. colonial zoiic uii a roiicessioii basis (with Ameiican "Zonians") isolat- 
ed from the new host rountry, hut otherwise a crrrain WASP disrasrc fnr rhe <l~1icrirlerit sricic- 
ty (beyond, as in Cuba, for the invention of systematic sexual touris~n). '~~ Finally defeated, 
Spain could he treated with a certain disdainful indulgence, which, although it did not exactly 
erasc old Protestant verities, also served to remind WASPs of the subtle distinction between 
"Spaiiish" (I;iiropran, Whitr, r v r n  rlassy "firrr romcrr" in places Iike Arizona or California) 
and thc dusky Hispanic palc.106 
In other words, rhe propaganda of both Cuhan separatists and Spanish eolonialisrn, in ap- 
pealiiig to stereotypes, was instrumental in deterinining An~erican artitudes, borh during the in- 
dependence struggle from 1895 to 1898, when the irnagrs of the Cubans called out to the Whig 
vision, and rhen, wirh the problem of Spanish oppression solved, when the Spanish racist "re- 
rninder", carric out of failure to impose itself as the dominant perspcctive. With thc swirch in 
U.S. attirude, Cubaii narionalisin narurally turned to Spain in an einbracc of ncwfound broth- 
erhood ofnppression, a hug which Spanish nationalisrn erithusiastically rcruriied: a unity of lan- 
guage, of spirit -of civilizarion in the face of the materialistic "Colossus of the North" and thr 
onerous weight of thc "yanqui dollar".'"Spain needed participants to justify and share the idea 
that it remained a veritahle "cultural ernpircU, despite its patcnt hackwardness in cruder terms 
iif [irrirliii:riue ilrueloprneiir.lo8 Slich senriinent, of course, did iiot keep Cubaii nationalisni from 
crushing Afro-Cubans as a suppored "threst" in 1Y12 nur frum rxpcllirig " g u l l y ~ r "  (i.c. C~iai i~ 
ish imrnigrants) as an analogous labor menace in 1933."Jy 
Iii this seiise, 1 am preseiitiiig the propaganda surrounding 1898 as establishing "self fulfill~ 
ing prophccy". Adjustcd tii a foundational propticcy, fincd ai ;i spc~ific turii iti political events, 
thc discoursc srill fccds inro historiographir "paradigms", alhrir in mor? romplex ways. This rx-  
changc of propagarida-drrivrd pruplircio brrvcs LO illustrats a laigcr prolilein in thc intcraction 
uf politics aiid liistoriograpliy. As Mettoii Iiiniself ohserved, to break "the tragic, oftcn viciour, 
circle of self fulfilling prophecies", "[tlhe initial definition of thc situation which tias sct tlic 'ir- 
cle in rnotion rnust be abandoned. Only when the the original assumption is questioned and a 
nrw definirion of rhc siriiation tnrrodiicrd, does thc conscqucnt flow of cvcnts gi1.c thc lie to the 
assumption." H e  cvcn goes on, with sociological optirnism to assure that institiitional opposi- 
tion to s~lf-fulfilling prophcries -"sing thc rxplirit exarnple of U.S. raci~rn- could serve as break, 
lo4 R F  Werroii (1972), rhap  6 Foi rl ie ronrrarr berwern Cuba's pugnarious narionalirrn and Purrro Rir;in idcnrity, rrr: 
A. Cubano (1995). 
'OJ D. McCullough (1977). 
'O6 An oprimisric perceprion i n  R. Sánchez Manreio (1994). 
lo' J.M. Macarra Vcra (1994). 
'O8 F.. Ucclay-Ua Cal (1998). 
'O9 A. H e l g  (1995), chapi. 6-7; S. Faiber (19761, p. 44 
since such forrns of social communication opersti "only in the absenre ofdclibcratc institutional 
controls" that ncgatc themllu This is clear for tlie ccn~ury-old Cuban-U.S. logjarn berweeri 
locked nationalisrns and rrosscd diplomatic iiiicrests. Thc question, however, fur historians of 
Spain is how this sziinc circular dynarnic can still keep going. 
In conclusion, 1 hhould underline that the iiitcrprctation here presented in no way contra- 
dicu Percz's dcscriprion oC ~ l i e  rricrital changes thar American written opinion underwcnt in 
1898, before: its Iririg-l:isring solidification inro a recurring pattcrn. Riit i r  docs sct surh a pro 
grt:ssion in a hroader perspective, and, 1 would hope, hrlps understand how tlie riir:i:rraiun of 
perceptions a n d ,  especially, the final definition- could so quickly jiirnp in mood rhen becomc 
fixed and set. The  cleepcr reasun, 1 arn ruggerting, was that Arnerican attitudes rowards Cubans 
and Spaniards wcre liinited in rarigr, situated in an old but flexible perspective which offered 
a short list of rolrs. I ' h e  rrrults were forcscablc, except, of iourse, to Cuban natiorialists, who 
wrrr to paya high pricc for rheir earlier rnanipulition of stereotylics dceper and more unrnan- 
ageablc than [hey imagined. 
""R. K. Mcrtun (1968), pi. 478,490. 
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